Let’s dive deep into the numbers of Super Bowl LVI.
As the game between the Los Angeles Rams and Cincinnati Bengals approaches, I went hunting for angles and storylines in the data to see which team has an edge and where. As it turned out, most of what caught my eye supported the Rams, who are 66% favorites to win, according to ESPN’s Football Power Index.
I’ll hit a variety of statistical notes below, including: the similarities these teams share in their run vs. pass decisions; an offensive lever L.A. coach Sean McVay pulls to gain an advantage; the Bengals’ improvement against 2-high safety defensive looks; how big a mismatch in the trenches Cincinnati faces; and why most Joe Burrow passing stats should come with a grain of salt.
To find these storylines, I leveraged NFL Next Gen Stats, ESPN-created metrics that use NGS player-tracking data and more traditional advanced stats like expected points added (EPA) and QBR. Here are five things I found:
Pass to win
Guess which teams ranked first and second in the largest difference in EPA per dropback and EPA per designed run in the regular season? The Rams (No. 1) and Bengals (No. 2).
The Rams averaged 0.22 EPA per play more on designed pass plays than designed run plays; the Bengals were at 0.21 more. In other words, every five plays that these teams elected to run instead of pass they gave up a point in score margin.
It’s a surprising statistic for two teams in the Super Bowl, because it means their run-pass ratios were suboptimal. While it’s true that increasing their usage of pass plays might have lowered their effectiveness, that would have been perfectly fine: The gap between the value of Rams’ and Bengals’ pass plays so far outweighed run plays that trading runs for passes that were, on average, slightly less effective than normal pass plays would have easily been worth it relative to runs.
I wanted to see if I was alone in thinking that these teams run far too often. Focusing just on the Bengals, I asked six current or former NFL analytics staffers the following question:
“You’re in charge of the Bengals for the Super Bowl. Quarters 1-3, outside two minutes, assume one score game the entire time. How many early-down carries are you giving Joe Mixon?”
The average of their answers: 5.8 carries, or about a 19% rate based off the Bengals 30.7 average first- or second-down snaps in the first three quarters, inside two minutes excluded. (Respondents gave their answers in either number or rate and I translated between).
For context: With the game within one score, the Bengals ran 46% of the time on such occasions this season, including their three playoff games. In other words, the analysts felt that the Bengals ought to dramatically cut down their early-down run rate in the Super Bowl — exactly what the EPA per play differential suggests, too.
The counterargument will surely be that the Bengals will need to run the ball to slow down the Rams’ pass rush, but I’m not sure that’s actually a reason to run the ball at all beyond just keeping Los Angeles honest. The best way to get sacked is to face third-and-long or third-and-medium, and running on early downs puts the offense in danger of that.
Fortunately for the Bengals, their Super Bowl opponent also punts away valuable expected points by leaning on the ground game too often.
The Rams’ designed rollouts
Designed rollouts, which allow an offense to gain a number advantage on the opposing defense, are a staple of the Rams’ offense. L.A. used designed rollouts on 10% of its dropbacks in the regular season (9% including postseason), per NFL Next Gen Stats, the highest rate in the league.
It has worked. The Rams averaged 0.27 EPA per designed rollout and 0.17 EPA per all other dropbacks. It’s not just a team-specific edge, though, because that advantage plays out across the league: designed rollouts accrued 0.20 EPA per play this season compared to 0.03 for non-rollout dropbacks.
While play-action — a known offensive advantage — is responsible for some of the effect here, it is not responsible for all of it. Even if we look at only play-action dropbacks, those with designed rollouts still outperformed those without by 0.09 EPA per play — the equivalent of the difference between the Chiefs’ offense and Vikings’ offense in the regular season.
Designed rollouts without play-action (far less frequent) also held had a 0.14 EPA per play edge over other non-play action dropbacks.
Leaguewide, designed rollouts have steadily increased in usage. They made up 3.2% of dropbacks in 2018 and that rate has gone up every season since, reaching 5.8% this season. The Rams are just ahead of the curve.
And while the sample is tiny, it is just worth noting that the Bengals allowed 0.46 EPA per designed rollout this regular season, fourth-worst in the league.
Burrow vs. 2-high coverage: A tale of two seasons
In Weeks 1-9, Burrow had a QBR of just 33.6 vs. 2-high coverages, which was fourth-worst in the league in that span. From Week 11 on — after the Bengals’ bye — that QBR against 2-high coverages ballooned to 58.1, seventh-best.
That’s a crucial development for the Bengals in the Super Bowl, because the Rams have run 2-high coverages 48% of the time this season, the third-highest rate in the league.
So what changed? For one thing, Burrow and the Bengals started attacking the intermediate part of the field — particularly with in-breaking routes — more regularly and with more success. After the bye, Burrow targeted the intermediate part of the field 21% of the time vs. 2-high (up from 14%) and his QBR on those throws was 99.7, with the most success going to Tee Higgins.
All of this is a small sample and could just be noise, to be sure. But we can see that Higgins’ role against two-high coverages changed with more routes over the middle. The chart on the left shows Higgins’ routes prior to the Bengals’ bye, and the chart on the right shows his routes after the bye, including the postseason:
Cincinnati will need that success vs. 2-high to beat the Rams.
The Aaron Donald mismatch
It has been pointed out in many places that the Rams’ defensive line is a mismatch for the Bengals’ offensive line. I want to illustrate just how extreme this is, however, particularly for Donald.
Donald, naturally, ranks first in pass rush win rate (PRWR) among defensive tackles; his 26% PRWR at the position is over 5 percentage points ahead of Chris Jones, the next-highest. And he is going against some of the worst pass-protecting guards in the league.
Cincinnati’s Hakeem Adeniji and Quinton Spain rank in the bottom five in pass block win rate among guards this season (including the postseason). Jackson Carman, who got some playing time in the AFC Championship Game in Adeniji’s stead, didn’t technically qualify, but he would have ranked last among all guards in that span if he had played enough snaps.
What’s scary is that it is basically indicative of the entire matchup: The Rams rank first in pass rush win rate, and the Bengals rank 30th in pass block win rate. It could get ugly.
Passing stats don’t tell the whole story
Be careful with Burrow’s passing numbers. This season, he led the league in yards per attempt (8.9) and completion percentage over expectation (plus-6%), via NFL Next Gen Stats. No doubt those are impressive feats. They also happen to leave out the part of playing quarterback where he does not excel: avoiding sacks, avoiding interceptions and using his legs.
Burrow’s 8.6% sack rate in the regular season was fourth-highest in the league, and while the Bengals’ lackluster offensive line was definitely responsible for a good part of the problem, his .29 sack-to-pressure ratio was third-worst among QBs. His 2.4% interception ratio was 10th-worst, and he scrambles at just an average rate.
All of these are reasons why Burrow ranked only 12th in Total QBR in the regular season. He can be great, but where he stars is on plays in which he attempts a pass. We shouldn’t filter out all the others.
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